What Is It Like to Be a Bat by Thomas Nagel - 1343 Words

In â€Å"What is it like to be a bat?† Thomas Nagel argues that physicalism cannot possibly account for consciousness and quaila, or qualitative states. The objection in his article is target the flaws of both functionalism and physicalism with emphasis on the importance of consciousness and its subjective nature. In this paper, I will argue on Nagel’s argument but also focus on how a functionalist can respond to his objection. To explain what physicalism or functionalism stand for in philosophy, I will introduce an idea of mind-body problem first. The mind-body problem concerns with the relationship between the mind and the body, questioning how mind and brain are related. It is a mental description examining how each relate and interconnect. From this, many beliefs or solutions have formed, including a monism, a belief that mind and body are the same and not separate substances. Physicalism is a version of monism. The physicalists claim that the mind is ultimately something physical. In their belief, the nature of the whole world, including behavior and brain states, are physical. This means that behavior is something that you can measure, compare, or touch like an actual physical object. Every aspect of mind that is analyzable in means of physical senses are physical according to physicalism. Functionalism in philosophy defines mental states as internal states, individualized and differentiated in terms of different functional roles. It defines mental states in terms of theShow MoreRelatedThomas Nagel : A Summary And Critical Assessment1613 Words   |  7 PagesThomas Nagel: What Is It Like To Be a Bat?: A Summary and Critical Assessment Author: Daniella Soleimani Turnitin ID: 483308362 PHL 611 Philosophy of Mind Section 1 David Checkland Final Essay Friday, November 28th 2014 Common mistake that is often made is presuming the works of something or someone else’s consciousness. In fact, it is impossible to understand someone or something else’s consciousness without being them. In What Is It Like to Be a Bat, Thomas Nagel draws hisRead MoreThomas Nagel - How Is It Like to Be a Bat? Essays888 Words   |  4 PagesThomas Nagel (1981) – How is it like to be a bat? Why does consciousness make the mind-body problem really intractable according to Thomas Nagel? In his text â€Å"What is it like to be a bat?† of 1974 Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the barrier that makes the mind-body problem unique and so hard. He states that consciousness is rarely addressed by reductionists. Because there is no really persuading reduction available, implausible accounts of the mental have been developed to help Read MoreWhat is Physicalism?803 Words   |  3 Pagesthe body: a physical entity. Thomas Nagel is a philosopher concerned with consciousness and the mind-body problem. Nagel states that consciousness is overlooked from the physicalist standpoint of understanding the mind. Thomas Nagel believes that the inability to imagine what it is like to be a bat is a problem for physicalism. The human mind is capable of understanding what it would be like as a bat, but is incapable of thinking how a bat experiences being a bat. Nagel discusses the idea of subjectiveRead MoreThe Bats, the Blind, and the Butterflies Essay859 Words   |  4 Pagesdescribe the â€Å"mind-body problem.† In the article, â€Å"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?† author Thomas Nagel provides his own view on the mind-body problem. He begins by stating that consciousness is the reason why the mind-body problem is so controversial and difficult to solve. The reductionist (i.e. materialist) believes that every human’s mental states are simply the results of the physical components and chemical reactions of the brain. Nagel claims that every reductionist has a favorite analogyRead MoreThe Mind Body Problem : Nagel s Theory Of Phenomenal Consciousness834 Words   |  4 Pages We have all wondered and asked ourselves what it would be like to be something other than yourself. However, some experiences are just completely beyond human understanding. Thomas Nagel, in â€Å"What is it like to be a Bat? †, explains the importance of consciousness as well as the subjective character of experience by using multiple examples, defining this phenomenon of consciousness arguing that it is an essential part of the mind-body problem. This exegesis will be concentrated on exploring Nagel’sRead MoreThomas Nagel And Frank Jackson Do Not1006 Words   |  5 Pagesphilosophers divided in between the two. Philosophers Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson do not. Both philosophers have found problems with physicalism that seem to make the theory less sound. However, functionlists who are physicalists can argue back in objection to Nagel’s proposal to make the physicalists approach more sound. Thomas Nagel believes that physicalism has a problem because it does not account for consciousness. He uses the concept of â€Å"what it is like† to show how the idea of physicalism has aRead MoreUnderstanding The Mind Body Concept1674 Words   |  7 Pagesfor giving one’s attention. Thomas Negal on the other hand, finds the problem rather interesting. Negal’s â€Å"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?† proposes a number of arguments, one of them which states that the subjective approach to the mind-body problem should be abandoned for a more objective approach (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The purpose of this essay is to show that Negal’s arguments are sufficient in describing whether it is indeed possible to know what it is like to be a bat, portraying his arguments inRead MoreThe Mind Body Problem, By Thomas Nagel1352 Words   |  6 PagesConsciousness, Thomas Nagel states, â€Å"is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.† Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as â€Å"perceptual experiences,† and Nagel describes as â€Å"something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argumentRead MoreWhat Does It Be A Bat?1570 Words   |  7 PagesAs stated by Thomas Nagel in his paper â€Å"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?† consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Reference). By this, he means that the relationships between the subject mind and the objective physical body are difficult to control or to deal with. Nagel states that without consciousness the problem seems less interesting, and with it, it seems impossible (Reference). Reduction has been a common method to attempt to link the relationship between the mindRead More The Mind Brain Identity Theory1689 Words   |  7 Pagesâ€Å"considerable blow† to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory—a theory developed by J.C.C Smart—in which he [Putnam] stated â€Å"mental states are multiply realizable.† His argument is driven by functionalism. His functionalist account of mental states like pain differs from what is explained by the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. In turn, he also avoids the issue of multiple realizability, an issue that was proven to be problematic for the Identity Theory. This leads into John Searle s argument against Strong Artificial